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The Rise of the ‘Grand Entrepreneurs’ in the Czech Republic 
and Their Contest for Capitalism*
VLADIMÍR BENÁČEK**
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague
Abstract: It is argued in the article that the peaceful transition to capitalism in com-
munist countries was not possible without the co-action of the nomenklatura,
whose interest was to transform their informal access to state-owned capital into
an authentic ‘grand entrepreneurship’. The necessary acquisition of physical cap-
ital was achieved by means of mass privatisation schemes in which the nomen-
klatura took advantage of their social capital and information asymmetries. In the
Czech case, there were three social groups competing for a position among the
new entrepreneurial elite. The initially large gains of the nomenklatura gradually
eroded when new businesses opened to domestic and international competition,
where competitiveness depended on endowments of human (entrepreneurial) and
economic capital. In the subsequent wave of ownership restructuring, initiated af-
ter 1994, the former nomenklatura was partially squeezed out of the tradable sec-
tor, which was occupied by better skilled foreign and domestic entrepreneurs. The
exiting entrepreneurs converted their holdings into consumer goods, or defected
to sectors less open to competition, where the alignment of social capital and bu-
reaucracy persisted. Their position depends now on the pending reforms of pub-
lic administration and the search for a more efficient social model.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, transition, ownership, forms of capital, social ad-
justment
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The most important prerequisite for becoming
an entrepreneur is the ownership of capital. 
[Kalecki 1954: 109]
Entrepreneurs and capital
The communist system of social organisation was indeed a system irreconcilably
different from every stream of capitalism [Kornai 1992]. In comparisons of the two
systems it is usually the economic approach that dominates over the political and
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the social. The diametrically different roles of capital, private property, factor mar-
kets, and competition between enterprises are what distinguish and set the tone of
the institutions of capitalism and socialism that exist today.
Unfortunately, in contrast to abstract systems, a superficial observation of re-
ality may lead to confusing conclusions once it is discovered that both systems were
mixed [Samuelson 1967]. Therefore, some seemingly similar elements, like the ex-
istence of money, wages, private farming, and retail shops in socialist systems, and
the existence of state firms or the tricks of relaxing hard budget constraints in cap-
italist systems [Maskin and Xu 2000], may evoke the idea of convergence. The com-
parison of real systems requires a multidisciplinary approach. The essential differ-
ences in economics should therefore be extended to politics (e.g. to the study of
democracy) and also to sociology, which looks at the differences in social structures
connected with capital ownership and entrepreneurship.
As the above quotation from Kalecki indicates, it is the ownership of capital
that separates entrepreneurs from the owners of the labour force (including man-
agers), who are hired by the former as wage earners. Nevertheless, even though the
ownership of capital is a necessary precondition for becoming an entrepreneur, it
alone is not enough. According to Marshall and Schumpeter, entrepreneurs are cap-
italists endowed with the capacity to organise and innovate, thus becoming the
agents of constructive destruction as a crucial condition for economic development.
According to Eswaran and Kotwal [1989], it is the role of entrepreneurs to act as de-
cision-makers and risk-bearers in relation to capital yield, its reproduction and ac-
cumulation. Therefore, entrepreneurs are not merely passive nominal owners of
capital (as, for example, some rentiers), but deliberately open their ownership posi-
tion to the uncovered risk of its loss by allocating it to new innovative ventures.
The definition of an entrepreneur best suited to this study is Leibenstein’s
[1995] description of an entrepreneur as an agent endowed with capital and organ-
isational, innovative, and managerial skills that allow him ‘to make up for market
deficiencies’. It is not the ‘invisible hand’ of the market but the minds of the very
visible entrepreneurs who bear the burden of capitalism and extend its frontiers be-
yond the horizon. The more deficient the markets are, the more it is the entrepre-
neurs that must bear the toil and risk. Given that transition is characterised by de-
ficient markets, entrepreneurship must be taken as a crucial factor of transition.
This devilish ‘detail’ has been largely overlooked in economics because the as-
sumption has been that markets are perfect and self-enforcing, and the entrepre-
neur is just a mediator between supply and demand. In contrast to axiomatic eco-
nomics, management studies adhere more closely to the concept of Marshall and
Schumpeter, which treats entrepreneurship as the fourth production factor. Given
the markets, competition and private property, it is the entrepreneur alone who is
supposed to orchestrate their synergy and generate the growth. 
To apply a sociological perspective to this question, we can say that the core of
authentic entrepreneurship is the ownership of economic (financial and physical)
capital, but accompanied necessarily by cultural (human, entrepreneurial, ethical)
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capital, which facilitates the management of economic capital. As an auxiliary com-
plement external to the market system, entrepreneurship can also be sustained by
social capital [Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley 1998: 23]. Its role varies according to the
market structure. If the markets are perfect, the role of social capital is low; if the
markets are riddled with imperfections, its role rises sharply, to the point of inca-
pacitating the market. In the literature, social capital is often referred to as network,
relational or political capital. Its association with social hierarchies, politics, lobbies,
and vested interests is obvious. In this study the subdivisions of three basic kinds
of capital will be considered as synonyms.
The economic theory of specialisation based on the choice of effective inputs,
so-called factor proportions theory, is intrinsically associated with the endowments
of factors. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, an economic activity will in-
cline towards efficiency in achieving its productive aims only if it is making more
intensive use of a factor that the country is better endowed with relative to other
countries [Jones and Kenen 1984]. Some more parallels can be found here. A change
in the endowment in some factor (relative to others) is explained by the Rybczyns-
ki hypothesis, which implies that such a change will lead to a shift towards the pro-
vision of such commodities that use the growing factor more intensively. If applied
to the case of high endowments of a country with relational capital (relative to de-
valued economic or human capital), we should expect a shift to those activities that
depend on the use of such capital; for example, to the suppression of market-based
competition and to a rise in competition based the mobilisation of bureaucratic
clout and the use of crony-networks.
It is the ownership of economic capital that defines an entrepreneur, whose
role should be contrasted with that of managers, who possess human capital only.
Thus the managers must act as agents, that is, as the labour hired by the entrepre-
neurs, who act as principals [Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985]. We should also be able to
distinguish between two levels of entrepreneurship – big and small. The grand en-
trepreneurs are thus large owners of capital holdings that employ hired labour,
meanwhile the small entrepreneurs are small capital owners, who can just employ
their own or their family’s labour. From the legal point of view the grand entrepre-
neurs could be defined as statutory owners of limited liability companies or owners
of controlling interest in joint-stock companies.
In this article we will concentrate on the evolution of grand entrepreneurs in
a concrete transition country (Czech Republic). We will treat them as the leading so-
cial agents of capitalism – the socio-economic elite, in popular parlance referred to
as ‘the top hundred thousand’. Special attention will be devoted to the processes
through which they emerged in the different stages of the Czech economic transi-
tion, including the phenomenon of the transformation of the former communist
elite into the new elite of grand capitalists.
Kornai [2005] recently came out with one of the most informative studies of
transitions. His analysis is unique for extending economic methodology into histor-
ical, social and political contexts. Kornai has characterised developments in Central
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Europe and China as ‘an unparalleled success story’, despite the ‘many mistakes
and disappointments’. It was unparalleled in historical comparison because it was
complex (economic, political, social and legal) and internally and externally peace-
ful in nature, and it achieved its goals with unprecedented speed. In this article we
will look at a similar theme of the drivers behind the transition, viewed through the
prism of evolving entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurship and the end of central planning
The fall of communism in Europe is often explained in a journalistic shortcut as a
combination of three factors:
a) the total economic collapse in these countries;
b) a political collapse resulting from their surrender to the pressure of US military
superiority;
c) civil resistance instigated by the emergence of dissidents as the recognised lead-
ers of the public’s craving for free markets and private property.
From the above it can be concluded that the communist system collapsed be-
cause of its total entrepreneurial failure, in terms of both economic governance and
political governance at the levels of the communist party, the police and the mili-
tary. That may sound logical given that, according to the strict definition of ‘entre-
preneurship’, no entrepreneurs could exist in a society without private capital own-
ership. The liabilities of ownership rested with the impersonal State and the per-
sonal accountability of communist managers concerned only their wage contracts.
However, the absence of private capital could have been approximated by the
existence of ‘shadow’ (informal) capital ownership under socialism, which allowed
the incumbents to appropriate a part of the capital yield. Although such a system
worked below economic optimum, its performance was considered ‘satisficing’,
that is, not so low as to cause the system to break down. Historical observations of
the period between 1917 and 1989 would tend to support this assumption. In other
words, socialist quasi-entrepreneurship allowed the system to survive even the kind
of economic and political blows that would otherwise have brought the capitalist
system to a collapse. 
At the same time, the third of the three factors listed above could be inter-
preted as a kind of ‘entrepreneurial’ victory, wherein civic organisation and dissi-
dent leadership outperformed the State. This would imply that while the communist
system was devoid of entrepreneurship, the skills of entrepreneurship were devel-
oping in the communist opposition. Unfortunately, as discussed, for example, by
Kornai [2005], this wishful conclusion is counter-factual. The communist dissident
opposition was generally marginal – more a symbol of hope than an organised force.
Even in its most visible manifestations (like in Poland in the 1980s) it would not
have had the strength to overcome the combined forces of internal and external
communist power on its own.
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Even though the failures of communist economic management everywhere
were very serious, the system of its half-blind central command should have been
able to achieve political integrity, the supply of basic consumer and investment
goods, an influence over developing countries, and a strong military and police de-
terrent to opposition and secure the continuity of communist rule – provided those
were the shared aims of the nomenklatura elite.1 Surprisingly, it was not the case.
The bottom line is that the massive abandonment of the communist economic sys-
tem cannot be explained as a result of just an offensive onslaught from the trench-
es of external and internal opponents. There must have been co-action on the other
side, too.
What first launched the transition in communist countries were the pro-mar-
ket reforms, however superficial and non-capitalistic these attempts at goulash com-
munism may have been. These experiments created openings for clandestine
progress towards a socialist ‘entrepreneurship’ at all levels of the economy, includ-
ing central planning. The nomenklatura was then able to reinforce its long-held sta-
tus as a class of privileged bureaucrats by conferring entrepreneurial tasks on itself.
The ‘old guard’ of the nomenklatura then gradually resigned, as if it were obvious
that central planning, public property, and totalitarian ‘democracy’ were a dead end
[Kornai 2005].
Within two years since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 this constellation of
domestic strain resulted in an escalating series of political collapses unparalleled in
human history. These coups, achieved so easily, were named ‘velvet revolutions’.
Since the hypothesis that the communist nomenklatura were completely overpow-
ered from without has been rejected, the motives for dismantling communism and
the agents behind them must be explained.
I will analyse this contest for control over the reins of economic power from a
sociological perspective by examining the social structures of entrepreneurs and test
the hypothesis that the communist nomenklatura in managerial positions had a
tempting incentive to become the new entrepreneurs. An alternative approach
would be to study the changes in political positions, as was done by Machonin et al.
[2006: 53–68]. They also contained an element of entrepreneurship. Both perspec-
tives overlap and reflect similar processes and outcomes.
The massive involvement of the nomenklatura in privatisation in all transition
countries suggests that it was not by chance. It was privatisation that elevated the
nomenklatura to the status of real entrepreneurs, notwithstanding the paradox that
it meant they accepted capitalism. This explains why the fight for ownership
through privatisation became such an obsession in post-communist economies and
why the more natural approach of building an authentic private sector by support-
ing de novo firms, as occurred in China, was not adopted [Sato 1995]. My hypothe-
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1 In this article ‘nomenklatura’ refers to non-dissident political, economic, and cultural elite
under the communist system. We will concentrate predominantly on the economic (manage-
rial) elite, distinct from the political (apparatchik) elite.
sis is that communist governance could not exist without some islands of entrepre-
neurship and with them the dormant acceptance of capitalism was also present.
Running the communist system required a great deal of entrepreneurship – to
survive, its management had to work through and overcome chaotic information
about cost efficiency, and the structure of the gluttonous final demand had to be
ranked by priorities, which were all in conflict. Managers were therefore required to
compensate for many of the market’s deficiencies and engage in entrepreneurial be-
haviour, as described by Leibenstein [1995]. But what kind of entrepreneurship
would this be? Baumol [1990] provides a clue, noting that human entrepreneurial ac-
tivities are present in all societies. The creation of entrepreneurial capital is a part
of human nature and it develops in all circumstances, even if its instruments are
constrained. The problem different civilisations face, therefore, is to determine un-
der what incentives and in which alternative economic fields (productive, redistrib-
utive or destructive) entrepreneurship is to be allocated.
Baumol’s classification distinguishes between the Marshallian-Schumpeterian
concept of productive entrepreneurship on one hand and its redistributive or de-
structive alternatives on the other hand. The crucial role is then played by market in-
stitutions, which must provide incentives preventing entrepreneurs from getting en-
gaged in redistributive, predatory or destructive ventures. The initial inclinations of
early communist ‘entrepreneurship’ aimed excessively at exploitative, redistributive,
and destructive [!] activities were gradually curbed by the post-Stalinist reforms.
Therefore, however bizarre the organisation of the communist economies may have
been, there was also some amount of entrepreneurship to be found in them, regard-
less of the fact that the private ownership of capital was strictly limited.
The social structure of entrepreneurship under communism
Motivations towards entrepreneurship in the formerly Soviet-dominated countries
have two sets of roots: capitalist and communist. As to the former, Central European
countries were able to rely on the cultural principles on which their societies had
been based two or three generations earlier. In 1948 Czechoslovakia had the most
competitive economy in Central Europe [de Ménil and Maurel 1993; Benáček 2003].
The legacy of capitalism and recollections of self-reliance were most useful in situ-
ations where the workers had to resort to moonlighting and bartering to support
themselves. This penurious situation was a result not just of the shortage of goods
but was also due to the fact that employment in the nomenklatura hierarchies was
not open to everyone on the basis of talent.
Also, the national stock of human (entrepreneurial) capital could not be fully
used in the official economy, so business skills remained largely outside the nomen-
klatura, where they were used either in retail trafficking or in an informal system of
providing friends with do-it-yourself services or items in exchange for services and
goods in kind. The entrepreneurial skills of the shadow economy were often frit-
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tered away by high transaction costs on the exchange side and by limited access to
technology. Nevertheless, these activities were a valuable form of entrepreneurial
training that could be useful once small business was liberalised. Due to internal
barriers, which varied in nature between sectors and regions, the legacy of capital-
ist entrepreneurship in communist countries was spread asymmetrically through-
out society. This had a serious impact later on.
The legacy of ‘communist entrepreneurship’ affected state bureaucrats and
party apparatchiks (together the ‘nomenklatura’), who also had to invent the most
bizarre tricks in order to force the unviable system of central command to perform.
It was not altruism, but a motive for achieving their private ‘residual claimancy’ (i.e.
rents), which actually brought their activity close to entrepreneurship. The Brezh-
nevian style of corporate management required personal initiative and innovation,
however absurd they were in both process and outcome. The management of enter-
prises had two options: either to focus inwardly by pursuing efficiency or outward-
ly towards negotiations with vertically superior bureaucracies.
Given the known lack of microeconomic rationality in the system of central
planning [Hayek 1935], the management of efficiency and innovation could only re-
ly on some rudimentary principles, such as minimising queues, saving on material
input and labour, or copying the products and processes used in market economies
[Kornai 1980]. As for the outward focus, the objective was to bargain for a softer out-
put plan or a higher quota of inputs. The latter was a sophisticated entrepreneurial
treat, where the gains were high, and they could be used to build up of powerful pri-
vate relational capital [see Bezemer, Dulleck and Frijters 2003; Blanchard and Kre-
mer 1997].
As the opportunities for official (and unofficial) accumulation of wealth
widened, socialist millionaires began cropping up everywhere, starting in the 1970s.
If this quasi-entrepreneur fulfilled the plan target and showed sufficient loyalty to
superiors, he/she received a free hand to exercise power over resources, staff poli-
cy, and bonus remuneration in the economic unit he/she oversaw within the hier-
archy. On the same horizontal level of hierarchical bureaucratic subordination this
manager had the power to collude with other ‘partners’ to form cartels, information
asymmetries and political coalitions, which liquidated potential interference in the
production, distribution or planning processes. As it gradually and naturally pro-
gressed, central planning evolved into a system in which agents and informal coali-
tions in the productive lower ranks of the command hierarchy controlled their prin-
cipals in the upper command of formal subordination [Mlčoch 1990].
The resulting socio-political antagonism caused by different relationships to
entrepreneurship can be identified with three social groups. Based on analysis from
previous studies [Benáček 1994, 1995], we will refer to them here as ‘marketeers’,
‘nomenklatura’ and ‘outsiders’:
(i) Marketeers: private farmers, repair workers, artisans, tradesmen; catering and
hotel staff, cab drivers, foreign exchange touts, greengrocers, used car dealers; shop
managers, shop assistants, stock keepers; entertainers, artists, top sportsmen; ad-
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ministrators of queues, bureaucrats issuing licences, certificates and permits; crime
ringleaders, etc.
(ii) Nomenklatura: directors of companies, their deputies, heads of divisions or fi-
nancially independent units; paid party apparatchiks, high-ranking bureaucrats at
ministries, district and municipal councils; high-ranking officers in army and police.
(iii) Outsiders: people with a low degree of revealed evident entrepreneurial aspira-
tions, active mainly in the ‘do-it-yourself’ activities. However, there was a large mid-
dle-class sub-group with cultural capital among their ranks: doctors, engineers,
teachers, computer operators, scientists or clerks, whose entrepreneurial skills
could not be used under the communist system.
The mechanism of communism’s demise
Even though each of the thirty-one post-communist countries in Europe and Asia
had a different mixture of conditions leading up to the transition, the processes in
the countries of Central and Baltic Europe converged towards very similar out-
comes. The crucial factor in the demise of communist socio-economic organisation
can be found in the internal demand for the trinity of freedoms that the communists
could not provide:
• civic freedom (like freedom of speech and travel),
• political freedom (democracy),
• economic freedom (free enterprise and private property).
While the communist opposition comprised of the outsiders called for the first
two freedoms, it was the communist economic elite that realised the potential for
transforming their informal access (quasi-ownership) to state-owned capital into
formally legal ownership of economic capital. The instruments for doing so lay in
their dominant ‘ownership’ of relational capital and in the use of their better access
to cultural (human and entrepreneurial) capital [Sik 1993]. This kind of develop-
ment is in line with the concept of capital conversion elaborated by Bourdieu [1985],
and later applied in the analysis of the transition of Czech elites [Matějů and Lin
1995; Večerník 1996; Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley 1998]. The public’s daily en-
counter with the surrounding Western culture and businesses, the dual roots of en-
trepreneurship, and the elite’s possession of three types of capital combined to of-
fer the people a vision of transition to all three freedoms. However, in connection
with transition each social group had a different target and different prerequisites,
though they were all able to agree that some kind of transition should be undertak-
en and to act in accord.
The role of indigenous elites with entrepreneurial expectations in domestic
political shake-outs is therefore obvious. It was essential for maintaining their medi-
um-term objectives that they avoided any violent confrontation of power with other
social groups – their potential allies. All of them were aware of that. Thus, with the
exception of Yugoslavia, the transition of power proceeded without any large-scale
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armed intervention. In exchange, the communist nomenklatura did not lose their
access to the processes of privatisation, entrepreneurship and political change in
any of the transition countries [Benáček 2001; Winiecki, Benáček and Laki 2004].
The co-action of domestic elites from the ranks of the nomenklatura during the
early phases of the peaceful dismantling of communism was essential because elites
are more efficient in organising collective action than the loosely organised public.
The ownership of human and social capital by the nomenklatura became a valuable
contribution: it restrained the risk of economic breakdown and guaranteed a smooth
break-through. Thus the transition countries were able to muster new economic lead-
ers very quickly and without losses resulting from internal squabbling.
The strategy of converting the abundant endowments of social capital of the
nomenklatura into new endowments of economic capital was a rational one, espe-
cially in societies trapped in a situation of ‘building capitalism without capital’
[Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley 1998]. Economic capital, as a condition of new entre-
preneurship, had to be acquired in exchange for something else that already exist-
ed: foreign financial capital, domestic human capital, or domestic relational capital.
This was the crucial crossroads in all post-communist transitions. The result de-
pended on the bargaining power of these three capitals. Unsurprisingly, relational
capital has shown the highest practical operability in almost all initial business en-
counters. That explains why both the emphasis the new Czech governments placed
on large-scale privatisation (e.g. with vouchers or insider sales) and the ‘Czech path’
of privatisation (i.e. without much competition from abroad) was perfectly compat-
ible with the aims of the nomenklatura.
The communist social system was full of long-suppressed and accumulated
conflicts, which had to be addressed to find a new equilibrium. An immediate ex-
plosion of these conflicts and any attempt to eliminate the past elite would have un-
leashed chaos in society for a long time to come. Other transitions in the preceding
century, filled with victims and lasting for generations, provided some valuable his-
torical lessons. A peaceful transition has to be gradual, and that made co-action
with the outgoing power essential. The whole process of the subsequent social, eco-
nomic and political transformation could not be achieved by means of revolutionary
commands but through step-by-step negotiations at the micro-level. This can be
likened to a process of market tâtonnement, as described by L. Walras, and to the
process of bargaining to settle property rights, as explained by Coase [1960]. It is the
quest for reciprocal re-adjustments among millions of domestic agents looking to re-
allocate their diverse interests and capacities. It would therefore be a mistake if
some domestic central authority or intervening external force were to mastermind
and dictate the course of these complicated processes.2
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2 Such failing examples can be found in the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan or in
the external imposition of reforms during the German unification. A successful example can
be found in China. 
Settling local inter-human relationships that had been fettered for decades
had to be left to local negotiations in an environment of centrally secured non-vio-
lence. Surprisingly, these originally highly improbable gradual readjustments oc-
curred independently in all post-communist countries. It happened despite the myr-
iad of local trials and errors, missed chances and moral compromises that affected
nearly everyone and disappointed the expectations of instant ‘justice’. It was clear-
ly a strategy of second best that can be criticised for its seeming blindness. Never-
theless, this amazing process of social tâtonnement, a social parallel to market clear-
ing, in which the resolution of human conflicts could be fine-tuned gradually and in
peace, became, in the end, a strategy more efficient than any exogenous social en-
gineering. As Kornai [2005] pointed out, the transition was, after all, still extremely
fast and unprecedented in human history.
The gradual contest for capitalism was the most characteristic feature of the
evolution of entrepreneurship, especially in the crucial field of capital redistribution
and ownership, where human conflicts were traditionally most violent. Thus the
peaceful evolution of entrepreneurship, intertwined with the necessary ownership
changes, can be regarded as the cornerstone of post-communist transition. The
Czech lessons of the Velvet Revolution and then the ‘velvet divorce’ of Czechoslo-
vakia are of particular interest in this respect.
The Czech transition was ready for launching long before the external threat
from the Kremlin was lifted in 1983. The first signs of it had already emerged in the
Prague Spring in 1968. However, news from Warsaw, Budapest and Berlin in the late
1980s was essential to confirm that the local transition would not be isolated. The
power-game of triggering the transition and its consequences were thus in the
hands of the three groups mentioned above – the marketeers, nomenklatura and
outsiders, each of which had their own motives for change. Their entrepreneurial
skills and expectations in particular were the crucial factors that drove the transi-
tion process [McMillan and Woodruff 2002]. When the window-dressing of central
planning and hierarchical subordination finally lost its institutional support at the
end of 1989, enterprises and the economy initially barely registered any change: the
‘shadow management systems’ were already in control of the economy and ready
for transition [Benáček 1994, 1995].
We could ask how the nomenklatura ‘triggered’ the non-violent transition or
how the various actors reached agreements over all the trade-offs that had to be re-
solved? Was there not some sort of deliberate and purposeful planning involved?
These questions are incorrect, because they presume the existence of a centralised
command. The series of subsequent collapses was not planned in the Kremlin or the
White House, just as no central authority masterminded the decline of feudalism
and the advancement of capitalism. Evolutionary processes (e.g. the Darwinian evo-
lution or even market clearing) proceeds through gradual adjustments without be-
ing guided by any pre-agreed strategy. The abandonment of communism was a
spontaneous development in the minds of the masses of agents, including their
elites, who realised that change would not expose them to unbearable risks, and
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could even bring them new opportunities. Although the transition was tougher and
more roundabout in both procedure and outcome than the majority of actors as-
sumed, the basic idea was well founded and easily recognisable to anyone. The ‘trig-
gering’ could then commence with any major social shake-outs. The fall of the
Berlin wall acted like a fuse, its charge being an optimal critical mass, setting off a
chain of shake-outs all over the world.
Entrepreneurship in the early stages of transition
As mentioned above, it was the nomenklatura in state monopolies and not the bu-
reaucrats of central planning who were in control of the official parts of the econo-
my and who gained even more power when Gorbachev’s glasnost undermined the
instruments of totalitarian coercion. These national systems were ready for the se-
ries of subsequent transitions that occurred once a strong external shock cracked
the institutional braces in just one country. There was risk and uncertainty in par-
ticular cases, but on the premise of a gradual adjustment and the truce set up
through the Velvet Revolution the nomenklatura was not at risk of losing much as a
group. The advantage derived from their social capital endowment was unrivalled.
The marketeers were in a similar situation: they expected a better deal once their ac-
tivities were liberalised, having obtained an advantage in the accumulation of fi-
nancial resources.
The outsiders appeared to gain least out of their initial entrepreneurial en-
dowments, and their gains from the transition were originally associated with high-
er consumer choice and the introduction of democracy. Here a distinction should be
made between outsider elites (cultural and technical intelligentsia) and the rest of
the outsiders. The cultural intelligentsia had a jump-start in the beginning, when the
mission of building the new institutions of democracy, education and the economy
was placed on their shoulders. However, this mission was gradually outshone in im-
portance by other, more practically oriented tasks of property redistribution and the
political power struggle once privatisation issues began to dominate the stage after
1992. The initiative in building institutions thus shifted more towards the nomen-
klatura.
The technical intelligentsia endowed with human capital was offered better
entrepreneurial opportunities, even though not immediately in large businesses,
since their starting position directed them mostly to the small (self-employed) busi-
nesses. For example, 21% of all Czech employees were registered in self-employed
businesses by 1993. In 2003 that figure grew to 33.8%.3 Also in other Central Euro-
pean and Baltic countries the increase in the number of self-employed was high and
comparable to the situation in traditional market societies [Selowsky and Mitra
2002]. The growing number of small entrepreneurs must obviously been made up
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3 According to the Czech Statistical Office, Annual Yearbook, 1996 and 2004.
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4 This estimate agrees with the conclusions of Matějů [1997] and Machonin et al. [2006: 45,
79], where the latter estimate the share of former nomenklatura among the grand entrepre-
neurs at 36.8% for 1994, without distinguishing between the high and middle ranks.
mostly of those outsiders with some endowments of human capital. Although the
technical intelligentsia had delayed access to higher positions, its penetration into
the ranks of entrepreneurs accelerated after the mid-1990s.
While the outsiders began to catch up with the others, their ascent had an-
other unexpected outcome, as they clashed with the private sector that had already
been established under socialism, i.e. with the marketeers. A similar situation was
observed in Poland [Winiecki 2000; Winiecki, Benáček and Laki 2004]. The lack of
vision and flexibility on the marketeers’ part made them unable to withstand the
competition from the new business start-ups emerging out of the former ‘outsiders’,
and this caused the old private sector to shrink by 40–75%. A similar observation of
constructive destruction was reported in other countries [Gábor 1996; Eyal, Szelényi
and Townsley 1998]. This suggests the general hypothesis that the socialist marke-
teers ultimately did not possess adequately competitive skills and relational endow-
ments to make a smooth transition into the ranks of the new grand entrepreneurs.
Unfortunately, there are very few surveys that have studied the structure of
Czech entrepreneurs by social group and origin, although some information is pro-
vided in a study [Benáček 2007] on the origin of Czechoslovak entrepreneurs who
were registered as owners of big businesses in 1990–1992. Their structure was clas-
sified according to their highest working position achieved anytime during their ca-
reers prior to 1990. The most important findings include:
a) The probability of someone having been a communist bureaucrat and a top or
middle management position and being in the emerging class of ‘great private
capitalist entrepreneurs’ is very high (46.3%).
b) Approximately 37–42% of the Czech emerging ‘grand capitalists’ in 1992 were
people associated with the Communist Party.4
c) The rate of transition of former low-ranking state managers and supervisors in-
to big new private businesses is very high, forming 44% of the total number of
new grand entrepreneurs.
d) Only a small fraction of people (1.1%), who were neither engaged in the com-
munist nomenklatura networks, nor in any formal managerial position, have af-
ter three years succeeded in becoming grand entrepreneurs.
e) The chances of outsiders with human capital becoming ‘great entrepreneurs’ is
only 2.5%, which is still below the national average of 3%. However, the proba-
bility of such a transition occurring among the group of unskilled outsiders is
even lower – at merely 0.4%.
Outsiders were held back in their ascent into entrepreneurship owing to their
lack of initial wealth, owing to their exclusion from the power of the crony net-
works, and owing to the effects of discriminatory processes of adverse selection un-
favourable towards people with high moral principles. However, the outsiders and
low-ranking communist managers were not completely cut off from opportunities.
They had access to small businesses and self-employment. The pressure from hard
budget constraints was stronger these than in large (privatised) businesses, sup-
ported by special government policies [Winiecki, Benáček and Laki 2004]. Never-
theless, in the Czech case they made significant progress in efficiency and obtained
a high share in the market in the late 1990s, which became a springboard for future
expansion to become larger firms.
Other quantitative empirical studies have also looked at the origin and perfor-
mance of the new Czech entrepreneurs. Matějů [1993a: 86] concluded that being a
member of the nomenklatura resulted in ‘far higher chances to enter the group of
entrepreneurs’ mainly due to the role of the network capital accumulated in the
past. This was the driving force that triggered the transition and led to the early suc-
cess of the nomenklatura. Three mechanisms were involved. The first and most im-
portant was the comparative advantage of the nomenklatura in terms of its endow-
ment of social capital, which provided it with enough confidence to counter the
power of the opposition. Then there was the complementary advantage of nomen-
klatura in both managerial and human capital. Modern society needed these re-
sources; they were scarce and without substitute.
The third mechanism, albeit a minor one, was the greater wealth (savings) of
the nomenklatura compared to the outsiders. This fact was confirmed in another
study by Matějů [1993b], in which entrepreneurial success was measured by income
levels. A high statistical significance was found for such exogenous variables as in-
come in 1989, accumulated property before 1990, and a person’s prior position in
the hierarchy of the nomenklatura. Nevertheless, the study also confirmed the sig-
nificance of factors such as education and professional commitment to the job, both
of which demonstrated that the outsiders were not deprived of chances for entering
entrepreneurial ranks later. Thus the fulfilment of entrepreneurial visions for a per-
son endowed with ownership of capital of any kind was not beyond reality.
The changing structure of entrepreneurs in the later stages of transition
Since the start of the transition, the Czech government has made the transfer of
property relatively easy because more than one-half of all national physical capital
was offered for privatisation between 1991 and 1995. That gave an unparalleled
boost to the growth of large businesses, which favoured not only those social groups
better endowed with social capital but also foreign investors with high financial cap-
ital. The path-dependency of the capitalist future on the communist past was not
severed abruptly but rather steadily diminished. The competition for property in a
situation where information asymmetries, insider trading, moral hazard and weak
ethics dominated over economic and human capital could not last forever. The ac-
cess to property in such an opaque environment was biased, inefficient and pressed
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to a discriminatory selection of its elite by a mechanism of adverse selection, ex-
plained by Akerlof [1970]. That was a serious social threat.
National development depends very much on the national elite. An adverse
selection of elites can undermine the national ability to act autonomously in the
world and shift its politics to a sort of defeatist autarchy. It is possible to distinguish
between the economic, political and cultural elite in relation to three kinds of capi-
tal. In a globalised world, the existence of a strong indigenous economic elite gen-
erates the externalities of national leadership able to compete internationally, to
confidently uphold national culture, and to resist the ideologies of nationalism,
communism and other extreme movements.
In the Czech case, the high-ranking nomenklatura’s aim of easily defecting in-
to the entrepreneurial class proved viable from the start of the transition [Možný
1991]. However, there are reasons for its diminishing returns. The basic argument is
that while both economic and human capital are of crucial relevance for entrepre-
neurial performance in functioning market economies, the relational capital, as a
factor of market distortion, has a minor role when the economy matures [Eyal,
Szelényi and Townsley 1998]. Building capitalism by means of dominant relational
capital had the drawback of sub-optimal economic performance. So the progress of
the transition in the Czech Republic – establishing a market economy – was de-
toured by incompetent entrepreneurship, unsustainable property holdings, frauds,
profits derived from implicit subsidies, decision-making intertwined with state bu-
reaucracy and market competition impeded by government intervention. The result
was the economic crisis in 1997–1999 when real GDP fell by 1.3%. The macro-eco-
nomic misalignments were not the cause but a concomitant effect.
Most of the property distribution completed in the second wave of voucher
privatisation in 1994 was unsustainable and had to be redistributed. This required a
subsequent series of Coasian contract renegotiations, whose outcomes were Pareto-
improving. A new round of selection started on the markets that had already moved
from excess supply to excess demand. All new owners (including the inexperienced
or incompetent ones) were consequently exposed to competition with other indige-
nous entrepreneurs, foreign businesses, and imports. At the same time the share of
imports to GDP reached 60% in 1997, while the value of the Czech crown appreci-
ated steadily. Many entrepreneurs saw a bleak future themselves and abandoned
their sinking ventures by shifting the costs to someone else. Thus the ‘optimum’
strategy for failing entrepreneurs became the practice of taking advantage of wide-
ly neglected property rights. ‘Tunnelling’ (i.e. stripping the assets of the company,
its clients, banks, or public budgets) became a technique of enrichment compatible
(or even commensurate) with their entrepreneurial comparative ‘advantages’. The
redistributive nature of a large part of the Czech new elite was then fully revealed.
The same logic that determined the selection of the Czech old-new entrepre-
neurs also meant that the defaults in property rights had to stay, becoming para-
doxically a firm part of the game. If the visible hand of the law had been suddenly
enforced, the gradual process of peaceful transition would have turned into a vi-
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cious crisis. The hazardous laws of relational capital would have to be re-installed as
a dominant power, undermining the growing importance of economic capital.
Tunnelling certainly resulted in social losses, but it allowed inefficient entre-
preneurs to reap the fruits of access to ownership and transform a part of their
windfall economic capital into consumption and speculative assets. Even though a
part of their (and the national) productive capital was thus liquidated, some capital
was still able to find its way into the hands of new owners, who used it more pro-
ductively. However, stricter property rights, rules and efficiency-enhancing institu-
tions had to be gradually installed because the demand for them grew in strength.
Thus the structure of ownership kept converging to Pareto-optimality by means of
Coasian negotiations.
In the Czech case approximately 60% of new grand entrepreneurs were not
from the ranks of the nomenklatura and the importance of human capital was not
completely eliminated [Benáček 2007]. Entrepreneurially oriented outsiders were al-
so able to acquire the capital relinquished by the initial inefficient owners. When
the inflow of foreign investment intensified in 1995, the balance of economic pow-
er shifted. In 2002 foreign owners controlled approximately one-half of the produc-
tive physical capital in the country. The call for a substantial overhaul of the legal
system and judiciary received a boost from the EU requirement that the country
adopt the acquis communautaire before accession. At the same time the Czech gov-
ernment had to dismantle the system of ‘banking socialism’, whose bad debts (32%
of all credit in 1999) brought it to collapse. Consequently, practically all commercial
banks had to be sold to foreign owners. Banks and market competition became the
most important instruments pushing for enterprise efficiency.
The process of ‘velvet transitions’, unique in human history, required at least
two stages, each of which had different rules and involved different capital to de-
termine its functioning. This approach is an extension of Eyal, Szelényi and Towns-
ley’s seminal idea [1998] that social systems can be classified by the dominance of
different types of capital. In the first stage of the Czech transition it was the domi-
nant use of social capital accumulated during communism. In the second stage the
dominance was marked by the steady rise of markets requiring economic capital. In
reference to Kalecki’s maxim quoted at the opening of this article, it was only at this
stage that the entrepreneurs were able to acquire the status of authentic entrepre-
neurs and finally managed to become the owners of assets secured by law. It is
worth speculating about whether the transition requires a third stage to reach com-
pletion, in which human (cultural) capital would move into the dominant role
[Matějů and Vitásková 2006].
More recent studies have reached similar conclusions, confirming that the old-
new elite of the former Czech nomenklatura and the marketeers from the first stage
of the transition were not always selected on the criteria of the first best. Their po-
sition was unsustainable as society moved into the second stage of the transition
and the rise of the market, competition and efficiency-enhancing institutions of cap-
italism. In the Czech case this stage has been under way since 1994 until now. The
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new process of entrepreneurial restructuring was marked by the growing impor-
tance of economic and entrepreneurial capital. For example, Tuček [2006: 79] re-
ported that during 1994–2004 “the share of the old-new elite sharply decreased”.
Another study [Machonin, Tuček and Nekola 2006: 544] also concludes: “... the
gradual generational change in favour of younger and, in terms of education and/or
fresh experience, better qualified cadres: all this ... led in the final years of the 20th
century to the downfall of an important part of the economic old-new elite recently
discredited in the new environment of society”. “A genuine top business elite has
emerged in the Czech Republic, one that in principle differs little from its Western
counterparts” [Ibid.: 552].
Laki and Szalai [2006] reached a similarly upbeat conclusion, noting that the
stabilisation of indigenous grand entrepreneurs in Hungary in the late 1990s is rea-
son to set aside concerns that the transition in post-communist countries may have
undermined national integrity by depriving them of the ability to compete interna-
tionally. The majority of indigenous grand entrepreneurs of 2005 typically started
out as small businesses.
The 1989–2004 transition period was a productive time in the Czech Republic
and the country made evident progress in economic and social organisation. The
changes in the nature of entrepreneurship were particularly complicated owing to
several transitional stages in the acquisition of capital. The sectors of international-
ly tradable commodities became highly competitive, as it was integrated into world
markets. The importance of both economic and human (entrepreneurial) capital sig-
nificantly increased, as the links between relational capital and domestic hierar-
chies began to weaken, often to the point of irrelevance. These were replaced with
links to international capital, marketing networks and oligopolistic leaders. 
Many domestic entrepreneurs that had emerged in the early stage of transition
were forced to sell their ventures to international capital and/or exit from the busi-
ness sector completely [Djankov 1999]. Most of them were from among the former
nomenklatura. Nevertheless, the number of Czech businesses, registered as joint-
stock or limited liability companies, did not decrease, and all statistics have docu-
mented the rising number of entrepreneurs. There are two explanations: new en-
trepreneurs entered the scene and there was a defection to less competitive sectors,
such as internationally non-tradable services, with fewer budget constraints and
less competition. Some of these sectors were not forced to leave the stage of no or
formal privatisation (e.g. in health care, energy supply or education) and many
could continue to rely on help from public budgets and collusion with political par-
ties and state bureaucracy [Matějů, Schneider and Večerník 2003]. The nature of
this entrepreneurship does not differ so much from what it was like in the commun-
ist period. The role of relational capital is paramount for their survival, leading to
deep corruption and practices enabled by too little or too much of regulation.
The oversized government sector and its impotent surveillance over the provi-
sion of public goods, which make up approximately 40% of the GDP, became a
haven for quasi-entrepreneurship and inefficiency. Like many other European coun-
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tries, the Czech Republic is engaged in a process of patching up its social system
and postponing genuine reforms. If the Czech society is to avoid slipping into stag-
nation, it should take the next logical step: institutional changes that open up non-
traded and government sectors to authentic entrepreneurship, while retaining reg-
ulation over them where the public interest is concerned. Unfortunately, in this case
the drivers of change cannot be expected to come from the European Commission,
as they did in the transformation of the traded sector prior to EU accession. This
time the forces of change must be found inside the country.
As Pejovich has argued [1994], the main objective of privatisation should be
seen in creating the free market for institutions and for incentives supporting prop-
erty rights, that is, in shaping the demand for institutions supporting productivity.
From this perspective, the wrangle over capital transfers in 1991–1996 was an un-
avoidable detour prior to more substantial changes. There were too many vested in-
terests to avoid such a chaotic prelude. It was only in East Germany where the tran-
sition was orchestrated from the outside and the attempt at transition without de-
tours turned into a failure. The stage of social tâtonnement and that of the subse-
quent establishment of new market-enhancing institutions cannot be merged. Ulti-
mately, as Loužek concluded [2005], there was hardly any alternative to the govern-
ment strategy of the Czech transition, even though its many institutional tactics
could have been streamlined, thus mitigating the extent of its schizophrenia, frauds
and dead ends by providing more rules and information.
The class of elite entrepreneurs has developed gradually. Societies are locked
in the flow of history, culture and ideology, and it takes time to disentangle the traps
of transition, the evolution of which is an extremely demanding process that cannot
be tackled by an ‘enlightened’ central command. In the Czech case the present evo-
lution of entrepreneurship got stuck two-thirds of the way along. It should continue
in the sectors still under the control of the bureaucracy. Reforms of the public sec-
tor through the introduction of market institutions and managerial methods drawn
from the corporate world would be the natural finale of the entire transition. 
Although the transformation of the new EU member countries is reaching an
end, the topic of peaceful social transition is still new and has not yet been suffi-
ciently examined. In addition, it is complicated by many local specifics that prevent
a universal analysis. Transition processes will continue to occur in many other soci-
eties around the world. In another article by this author (see [Benáček 2006]) there
was an attempt to apply the experiences from Central Europe to the Cuban poten-
tial transition. We could also imagine that new approaches to transition will have to
be undertaken in Iraq and that societies of Iran, North Korea, or Afghanistan should
consider them, too, and compare such evolution with alternatives based on force.
The unexpected economic take-off in China or India cannot be explained dissociat-
ed from the gradual strategies to transition taken there. Even the EU-27 should think
about implementing gradual but fundamental changes in order to master the tran-
sition to viable and effective social governance in its member states.
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Conclusion
This article presents an attempt to explain the post-communist transitions as a se-
quence of logical steps within gradual social processes. They emerged out of the
legacies of both pre-war capitalism and the jugglery of communist management. To-
gether these influences became the seeds of entrepreneurial activity and of the as-
pirations of transformation into authentic entrepreneurship. Three crucial steps
were required, which pre-determined the peaceful nature of the transition:
a) The launching of the transition at a moment when the communist elite (nomen-
klatura) was under no direct external threat and when it had accumulated suffi-
cient social and human capital to be able to withstand the pressure of domestic
opposition.
b) The initiation of ensuing processes of gradual social, economic, and political ad-
justments, offering opportunities to all, where the social (relational) capital of
elites could be transformed into the ownership of economic capital. The various
forms of mass privatisation without sufficiently performing property rights and
economic institutions served that purpose.
c) The re-privatisation process and widespread bankruptcies, when competition
was firmly established and solid property rights were in effect and when the ad-
vantages in human or entrepreneurial capital over-rode the importance of social
capital. Only then was it possible for a competent new indigenous entrepre-
neurial class to emerge.
The aim here was to use the Czech experience to shed light on why the early
stages of transition in all post-communist societies offered so many opportunities to
the nomenklatura and why that process was partially reversed later on, especially in
the EU accession countries. As a policy recommendation, the transition should re-
frain from the direct confrontation of adversaries. Instead of some centralised in-
tervention, the conflicts should be re-directed to negotiable adjustments at micro-
social levels. A unique combination of gradual change and the rapidly progressing
stages of transition, heading towards the creation of new entrepreneurial elites, led
society towards a new equilibrium, with fast growth and social order. The lessons
from the peaceful, fast and effective transitions in the countries of Central and
Baltic Europe, despite their peregrinations and trials and errors in human con-
frontations enrich the history of the development of capitalism and can be used to
contemplate similar transitions in other societies.
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